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Books
Received
Syracuse Scholar will review selected books received from faculty
members past and present and from alumni of Syracuse University.

In Quest of the Absolute:
The Life and Works
ofjules Monchanin
Edited and translated by ].G. Weber
Cistercian Publications
and A.R. Mowbray, 1977
194 pp.
Dr. Weber is an Associate Professor of
French at Syracuse University.

Published by SURFACE, 1981

N

umber flfty-one in the Cistercian Studies Series, this book is
an account of a French priest who in 1939, at the age of
forty-flve, went to India to plant with his life the seeds
of a contemplative Catholicism that he hoped might eventually lead to
India's conversion. Half the book is given to Professor Weber's sensitive portrayal of that life, laced with his translations of selections
from Father Monchanin's letters and journals. The other half of the
book consists of selections from Monchanin's more formal writings,
again translated by Professor Weber.
A reader may well be impressed by the dedication of such lives-in
this case that of an intellectual who renounced a promising academic
career in Europe to minister to illiterates in a land to which he felt called and, if love means devotion, came to love more than his native
West. Outwardly the fruits of his dedication were negligible; this is in
keeping with India's own teaching that the mark a life makes on
history is of the order of a flnger that is inserted into a cup of water and
then withdrawn. At no time, before Monchanin's death in 1958 or
since, have there been more than six contemplatives in residence at
Shantivanam, Grove of Peace, the Christian ashram that Monchanin
founded .
Monchanin's interior life, too , poses problems. Few readers will
understand his active search for suffering as a door to the divine, a
search (not overplayed) that made me think of Simone Weil even
before I came to Monchanin's Notes on her. Even fewer will understand his conviction that, despite the nobility oflndia's own spirituality, which Monchanin genuinely respected, India must be Christianized to be saved. To our pluralistic times this seems chauvinistic, even
if the Christ that Monchanin envisioned "clothed in the glory of India" was not European . " India must be rethought in terms of Christianity, and Christianity in terms of India, as was done previously in
Greece, " he said (p . 95). Towards the end of his life this goal seemed
more remote than Monchanin had thought when he started.
The more I am with them, the larger the gulf seems that
separates us . . .. I have no idea how the Gospel of the one and
unique Christ ... can reach them. The holier they are the farther they are from it (pp.95 , 97).
Yet Monchanin 's dedication remained, and it shines through
Weber's pages convincingly. As a moving portrait of a life that was
lived in certainty and for others, this study is of more than historical
interest, more than a chapter in missology. In the best sense of the
word, it edifles. -Huston Smith
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Logic: Form and Function:
By J.A. Robinson
Edinburgh University Press, 1979
312 pp .

Dr. Robinson is Distinguished Professor of Computer and Information
Science and Logic at the School of
Computer and Information Science,
Syracuse University .
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ut where is Alan Turing in all this? The question creeps up on
us inevitably as we come to find our way about in Alan Robinson's absorbing book. The more seriously we approach the
science of logic in terms of "the mechanization of deductive reasoning," the more the name of Alan Turing engages our attention. For it
is the Turing machine above ali-I mean of course the concept of a
Turing machine , not any actual contraption to be found on land or
sea-that is generally supposed today to provide the link between the
electronic computer, on the one hand, and logic and mathematics as
abstract studies on the other. No knowledge of engineering, indeed no
knowledge of even elementary physics, is required in order to understand completely the concept of a Turing machine . It has even been
remarked that a disembodied spirit might prove to be a Turing
"machine," so problematic is its relation to the gross processes of
physical nature. No wonder the Turing machine can provide a link
between the abstract and the concrete.
Robinson never mentions Turing, though the mechanization of
deductive reasoning is advertised to be his central theme. Taken quite
by itself, the omission of Turing's name need cause no surprise. As a
technical treatise in logic filled largely with the quasi-mathematical
formulas characteristic of the subject, Robinson's book might be
allowed to go its own systematic way sublimely indifferent to merely
historical considerations. But Robinson is seen to be by no means indifferent to the history of his subject. Incisive commentary on Frege
and even Leibniz is very much at hand, and against that background
one cannot but envisage the three-Leibniz, Frege, Turing-as the
triumvirate that presides over logic viewed in terms of the mechanization of reasoning; Leibniz and Turing, certainly. Frege, the most important figure in the history of logic (the magic year of 1879 saw the
publication of the Begriffsschnft: ''in more recent times it has come to
be called the predicate calculus' ' ), is probably turning over in his grave
on being associated with Robinson 's mechanistic program. There is indeed a passage where Robinson, somewhat sneakily, in effect concedes
that the platonistic Frege might not be altogether happy with the role
that has been thrust upon him.
The book, then, is tendentious, and it is in the light of that tendentiousness that the omission of Turing must be understood . Part of the
answer goes as follows: Although the Turing machine is the link between the abstract and the concrete, it belongs on the abstract side of
the divide. Robinson's trailblazing papers of 1963-65 on the "resolution principle'' played a decisive role in translating the abstract idea of
a logic machine into practical, electronic terms-though again
(ironically enough) one need know no physics in order to understand
Robinson's purely mathematical papers. It remains fair to say,
however, that in an important yet hard-to-clarify sense one is strongly
tempted to regard Robinson's rather than Turing's work as opening
the way to the actual mechanization of reasoning where feasibility is
taken to be at a premium. Feasibility plays almost no role in Turing's
project. His machines have unlimited supplies of power! How
machines with limited power might even find shortcuts to solutions
proves indeed to be Robinson's special contribution.
Turing's indifference to merely practical considerations is reflected
in another dimension entirely. It has been argued with some justifica-

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol2/iss1/14

2

88-SYRACUSE SCHOLAR

et al.: Books Received

tion that Turing's work proves that the reasoning process cannot be
fully mechanized. (One thinks of his noncomputable numbers and socalled halting problem : will the machine simply procrastinate forever
and never come to a conclusion?) I believe that at one point Robinson
is alluding to this sort of consideration when he mentions "a purely
logical result . . . directly relevant to the subject-matter of the present
book ... which we judged to be too weighty for inclusion in it.'' The
argument of the book, then, rests on a certain simplification. One
suspects that it is the very ambiguity in Turing's historical role (being,
so to speak, both pro and anti the mechanization of reasoning) that
persuaded Robinson to bypass him in his own effort to reshape the
subject in terms of the resolution principle .
That one does not expect from a pioneering research worker in the
field the kind of lofty impartiality that is demanded of the disengaged
historian is of course true enough; and we are thus inclined to welcome
Robinson 's personal slant on the subject. And yet this appeal to extenuating circumstances fails to ring altogether true . Quite apart from
his mathematics, Robinson is himself a historian . He has written a
classic paper on Hume that has served to redirect the course of Hume
scholarship . In the present work, certainly, his subtle gifts as a
historian often peep out in the merest turn of a phrase, and it is thus
all the more alarming to detect the tendentious undercurrent.
Our misgivings come to a head in the role assigned to Leibniz,
whom indeed Robinson resembles in more than one respect. There is
of course the capacious intellect of both; and , strikingly, each came
late to mathematics, beginning alike as classical scholars. Both are
philosophers : Robinson has a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton.
Robinson's central thesis being that " deductive reasoning can be
mechanized-literally, performed by a machine ," we are invited to
believe that "the mechanization of .. . deductive reasoning" is "no
longer the dream of a Leibniz" but "is now a reality." Two points
need to be made, one substantive, the other historical. On the
substantive side it is to be noticed that Robinson may be taken to
qualify his thesis when he urges that ''deductive reasoning can be ...
performed by a machine just as many of the routine tasks of numerical
computation can be and have been" (my emphasis) . Well, there is
certainly one way of reading the sentence (perhaps unintended by
Robinson) according to which it is true. I must insist, however, that it
is much too readily assumed that machines certainly can, in an
altogether unproblematic fashion, add and subtract numbers. That
many of the routine tasks of numerical computation can be performed
by a machine I do not doubt , but only if such an operation is not taken
to imply that the addition and subtraction of numbers-something
that we do every day-is also done by machines. The routine tasks of
numerical computation may be reasonably taken to involve only syntactical operations. So far, so good . Above and beyond such operations, a semantic dimension must supervene if those operations are to
constitute the addition and subtraction of numbers. Rich in ambiguity, the term computer simulation issues an important conceptual
warning.
On the historical side the role of Leibniz must be seriously questioned. Eager indeed to reduce the reasoning process to a matter of
computation, Leibniz declined as a point of principle to take the
Published by SURFACE, 1981
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futher step of supposing that either-reasoning or computation-might be performed by a machine . Robinson eloquently concludes his book as follows : "One would like to think" that recent advances in mathematical logic ''may lead to the day when gentlemen in
dispute about some issue as to 'what follows from what' can pull out
their pocket logical machines and say, as in Leibniz' favorite vision:
Calculemus." Precisely. Let us calculate. -jose Benardete

The Family Papers:
A Return to Purgatory
By Burton Blatt, Andrejs Ozolins, and
Joe McNally Longman, 1980
144 pp.

Dr. Blatt is Dean of the School of
Education at Syracuse University. Mr.
Ozolins is a Lecturer in the university 's
Department of Education.

A

ritical debate has been going on in the field of mental retardation. The debate centers on deinstitutionalization. Can institutions be reformed? If so-how, and for whom? Which
groups of retarded people can live in the community? Burton Blatt has
long articulated the view that the classification of retardation alone
should not mark a person for exile to the institution . In his latest
book, The Famzly Papers: A Return to Purgatory, he has joined with
two exceptionally talented photographer-authors and book designer
Arnold Skolnick in producing a major new critique and chronicle of
America's retardation institutions. In the authors' own words, the
book is "an indiscretion"; it exposes legally sanctioned practices
which have oppressed powerless people.
More than a decade ago, Burton Blatt and Fred Kaplan shocked the
field of retardation with their photo essay Chn'stmas in Purgatory.
What distinguishes the present work from Blatt's previous exposes of
institutions is, among other things, the exceptional artistic quality of
the photographs and the fact that this book arrives on the scene a
decade after deinstitutionalization was declared a national policy.
Despite new legislation and substantial evidence of successful community programming even for the most severely disabled people, institutions are very much alive, if not well.
Human degradation seems to facilitate good pictures, perhaps in
the same way that mystery elicits fascination or that danger evokes excitement. Such is the case for these photographs . We see adults confined to cribs; silhouettes against the stark background of ward windows; head after head slumped over in drugged and bored stupor;
people surrounded by tile and terrazzo as if perhaps the architects
forgot where the bathrooms ended and the living areas began .
This new evidence of abuse, published in 1980 long after reform
was to have occurred, mimics the earlier findings of Blatt, Goffman,
Rothman, and other chroniclers of institutions: ''Hardly ever did a
toilet offer both a seat and paper .... No inmate has clothes of his
own; each day brings its chance at a grab bag, the common pool of
garments . One might turn up a nice flannel shirt with buttons one
day, but the next is apt to bring an old torn one . For most ... inmates
there are still no activities: no recreation, ... no deviation from the
routinizing purposelessness." Educational abuse is equally evident :
''A child can go unnoticed on the floor under a desk, though officially
he is receiving an individualized educational program ." For others,
' 'education consists of spending time purposelessly in front of a television set, learning to pass time.'' Vocational training has a cruel quality
of worthlessness : "Everywhere we visited, there were many men and
women sorting play money, filling pegboards with pegs, sewing rags
into long strips." Staff fear to speak out against abuse. Yet one

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol2/iss1/14

4

et al.: Books Received
wonders if the authors really believe that speaking out could do much
to remedy problems that seem endemic to both the best and worst, the
newest and oldest, the most expensive and least expensive institutions.
The authors talk of wrong attitudes, fearful ward staff, institutional
directors afraid to have their facilities photographed, teachers mired in
curricula but seemingly unable to teach, and a host of other problems
that add up, again and again, to custodialism. But these are symptoms
of institutional failure, not its cause . People are not institutionalized
for their good but for their money. As Blatt explains, economics is at
the bottom of problems which the well meaning have tried to treat as
educational, philosophical, or therapeutic. Indeed, for some, institutions have been profitable.
Most states finance institutions the same way people finance
their homes, by mortgaging the property. To pay off the mortgage, the states count on the money to which mentally retarded
people are entitled-most ofit through social security payments.
But such payment can be applied to construction debts only zf
those mentally retarded people occupy the buzldings. Thus, zf
the people were moved from a new institution to community accommodations, a sen·ous problem would anse: who would pay
off the bond holders? (pp. 52-53)
A weakness of the study is its brevity. The insightful and manifestly
important analysis of institutional economics provides a window on
the Family that Blatt, Ozolins, and McNally promise to critique. But
one wants more . Like its namesake The Pentagon Papers, the book
contains revealing, indicting, and particularly indiscreet data that expose the perpetrators. Battle scenes have their counterpart in the
evidence of ward life so well revealed by the authors' incisive words
and the photographic artistry. Yet we are given only a glimpse of the
institutional leaders. Why are we not taken to the board rooms and
the directors' offices? We want memoranda which will reveal the
perpetrators' thinking about litigation involving deinstitutionalization and the right to treatment; about hopes for reform; about community alternatives; about the shift of interest in the field from institutions to neighborhoods. We sense how the Family might regard
such matters, but we do not know for certain.
Interestingly, the alternatives which seem most convincing and
hopeful are small, modestly financed communities. They are programs
where productivity is nurtured. They are communities where being a
member means more than physical integration; it means a sense of
belonging. The authors visited the Camphill intentional community,
the L' Arche program, and community group homes and apartments
operated by Connecticut's Seaside Regional Center; from these settings they draw evidence that institutional life is not synonymous with
care for mentally retarded people.
What is most hopeful about this book is its authors' candor and
common sense . They warn researchers to place substance before
method: What is needed to understand these settings, they tell us, is
not objective studies but merely the recognition that the retarded are
also human beings. Objective and scientific questions lose their force
in the institution. For policy makers there is no master plan-just the
simple, decent proposal that every institution for the mentally retarded be closed. -Douglas P. Biklen
Published by SURFACE, 1981
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